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RESEARCH ARTICLE
‘The dreadful done’: Henry James’s style of
abstraction
Rebekah Scott
School of English, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
ABSTRACT
Since the 1990s, when the late novels of Henry James became a touchstone for
the ethical turn in literary criticism, ethical critics of different persuasions, such
as Martha Nussbaum and J. Hillis Miller, homed in on certain complex terms and
ambiguous avowals in James’s prose in their efforts to hold him up as an
‘exemplary’ writer, committed to ‘ethical’ values such as particularity and
singularity. In doing so, these critics overlooked the prospect that at this
point in his career James was testing a new sort of literary abstractionism.
Like painterly abstraction, literary abstraction makes room for the material
and the particular at the same time as it denies them. To illustrate this, I
examine a cluster of Jamesian keywords – ‘do/doing/done’ – from The Golden
Bowl (1904) and elsewhere, to dispute the view that James systematically
shuns abstraction. Instead, I propose that abstraction – depending for its
effect on absorption, entanglement, and bewilderment – be read not as a
withdrawal from life into ‘the vague’, cerebral, imaginary, or purely aesthetic
realm, but a move to create deep involvements between characters and
between readers and texts, and as such should be regarded as a central
motivation of James’s evasive late style.
KEYWORDS Henry James; ethical criticism; style; abstraction
They have no tone but their moral tone. They are highly animated abstrac-
tions, with the extraordinary, the brilliant property of becoming when rep-
resented at once more abstract and more living.
– Henry James on the characters of Henrik Ibsen, ‘London Notes: January
1897’ in Harper’s Weekly 41 (6 Feb. 1897), pp. 134–35
It was natural that he should care nothing for any abstract speculation or
inquiry; he was an artist throughout, desiring only the refracted light of
human imperfection, never the purity of colourless reason.
– Percy Lubbock on Henry James, Introduction to The Letters of Henry James
(London: Macmillan & Co., 1920), Vol. I., p. xxvii
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In the 1990s, the turn to ethics in literary criticism also entailed – as part of
itsmodus vivendi – a turn to the late novels of Henry James: The Wings of the
Dove (1902), The Ambassadors (1903), and The Golden Bowl (1904). Over the
next decade, ethical critics began to seize on the various ethically inflected
terms commonly encountered in James’s prose – abstract nouns such as ‘the
good’, ‘the right’, ‘the true’, ‘the real’, ‘interest’, ‘value’ –whichhave significance
in a number of discourses including but not restricted to ethics (e.g. aesthetics,
metaphysics, economics, sociology, theology). In their efforts to cast James as
an ‘exemplary’ writer, animated by an ‘ethical’ vocabulary and pledged, like
themselves, to an ethics of reading based on values such as particularity and
singularity, these critics failed to notice that James was experimenting with a
new kind of literary abstractionism, seemingly at odds with the concrete and
particular, and bound up with his rejection of realism. Like the painterly ten-
dency towards abstraction that was emerging in James’s day, literary abstrac-
tion celebrates the matter or materials of its aesthetic practice at the same
time, curiously, as it denies them – as part of a process of withdrawal and ideal-
isation.1 Given that contemporary reviewers often dismissed James for
‘abstraction-mongering’ and that academic criticism of James at least until
the mid-twentieth century tended to frame him as irredeemably abstract (cer-
ebral, disconnected from life, formalist in his literary ethos), the work of ethical
critics and ‘thing-theorists’ has been a welcome corrective, returning James to
the social, material world.2 I contend, however, that these corrective measures
have gone too far, since they pass over the positive effects of James’s style of
abstraction. Jamesian abstraction depends for its effect on the absorption,
engrossment, and bewilderment not simply of its characters but of its own
texture, creating a dynamism between withdrawal and engagement that
vitally contributes to the interest and animation of James’s prose – as he said
of the characters of Ibsen’s drama. To illustrate this, I look closely at Jamesian
‘doing’, a key abstract term which informs an effort on the part of his fictional
characters and his own persona to be punctilious (i.e. concernedwith points of
conduct as well as expressive detail and formal correctness) even as its very
abstractness evades signification, encouraging a generalised attentiveness
from the reader that is, strangely, without object. Jamesian ‘doing’, as I
show, has a wider tonal range than the merely ‘moral’.3
In what follows, I contest the view that the prose style of Henry James is
somehow inimical to the procedures of abstraction in its various forms (philo-
sophical, literary, artistic). Further, I suggest that the framing of James’s style as
‘exemplary’, and consequent to this as ‘ethical’, obscureswhat is perplexing and
devious and ensnaring about Jamesian style. William Empson remarked in
passing of Henry James’s late style that it was ‘sweetly funny in its way, but a
patent attempt to cheat’.4 One might wonder in which features of James’s
prose this ‘cheat’ resides. Perhaps Empson is recalling Locke’s ‘perfect cheat’,
the coup de langue in Locke’s arraignment of a figurative and allusive style of
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speechifying, which for him did little else than ‘insinuate wrong Ideas, move
the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgment; and so indeed [is] perfect
cheat’.5 In 1934 Edmund Wilson denounced James’s ‘dreadful’ novels of the
1890s as exercises in ‘a lifeless trickery of logic’ and his style as a ‘diversion’ ‒
of the devious rather than the amusing kind (‘that tendency on James’s part
to exploit the mysteries of technique for the purpose of diverting attention
from his shortcomings’).6 Using milder if still incriminating terms,
F. R. Leavis asked this leading question of James’s late style: ‘Isn’t there, in
fact, something evasive about James’s inexplicitness?’7 In his 1909 Preface to
The Ambassadors James is quick to pre-empt this kind of criticism (ubiquitous
in the review journalism of his day) by putting us on our guard, rather, against
the ‘inevitable treachery of even the straightest execution’.8 Certainly, if it is a
matter of James’s late style, evasiveness is one effect of his ambiguity, obliquity,
subtlety, and prolixity. Yet, as Ezra Pound observed in the commemorative
issue of the Little Review of 1918-19 that was devoted to James: ‘Be it said for
his style: he is seldomor never involvedwhen a direct bald statement will accu-
rately convey his ownmeaning,all of it.He is not usually, for all hiswide leisure,
verbose’.9 If the remarks of both Empson and Pound pertain, one might
reasonably ask how it is possible to be ‘direct’ and ‘devious’, or, for that
matter, ‘direct’ and ‘leisurely’, at the same time?
One compelling answer lies in the peculiar power of the abstract language
and sentence forms to which James increasingly turned in his later writing,
be it fictional or nonfictional. Like Empson’s ‘complex words’, James’s
favourite abstract terms have the quality of being ‘not recondite words,
but often the most common’.10 Both James and Empson rescue ‘common’
words from ‘crude’ usage. Empson clarified what would become his own tra-
demark critical procedure in the coda to Seven Types of Ambiguity (1930):
People sometimes say that words are now used as flat counters, in a way which
ignores their delicacy; that English is coming to use fewer of its words, and
those more crudely. But this journalist [sic] flatness does not mean that the
words have simple meanings, only that the word is used as at a distance, to
stand for a vague and complicated mass of ideas and systems which the jour-
nalist has no time to apprehend.11
The idea of words carrying ‘systems’ or ‘doctrines’, rather than simply ‘senses’
or ‘meanings’, was something that Empson, after two books exploring ambigu-
ity, was to fully set out in The Structure of Complex Words (1951). The sugges-
tion thatwordsmay be used ‘flatly’, yet in away that enhances their delicacy (‘as
at a distance’), is helpful in coming to terms with Jamesian verbal complexity,
which in part works on the types of ‘equations’ found in certain words ‒ in a
dynamic of false equivalence ‒ and in part on abstraction, a mode of Jamesian
‘distancing’, or, as James puts it in several of his Prefaces, of ‘delicacy’ and ‘indir-
ection’. James’s verbal distancing is motivated by his desire to uphold the
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‘proprieties’ and ‘decencies’ of expression (in respect to his characters’ treat-
ment of each other in dialogue, and to his own ‘treatment’ of them in prose),
and also by his desire to handle his peculiar set of terms at a ‘critical remove’,
some would say with irony.12 His method of setting up then ‘going behind’
surface flatness, I believe, is evident down to the basic level of word choice
and arrangement.
All this is not to suggest too great an affinity between the ‘complexities’ of the
twowriters.Whereas for Empsonhis purposewas to bring to lightwhat he called
the ‘equation’ or the relation between two or more senses that had come to be
lodged in the everyday usage of a word (such as ‘delicate’ or ‘wit’) at a certain
moment in its evolution, for James the point was to show how certain words,
always abstract in nature (such as ‘form’, ‘relation’, ‘interest’ or ‘value’), invite
the identification or confusion of two or more fields of discourse. Such words
are typically prone to being taken in starkly absolute terms (as concepts) rather
than in context-specific ones (as words). As James wrote in a letter to the Amer-
ican scholar of neologism, Leon Mead, author of HowWords Grow (1897):
I have attempted only to write in a language already existing & consecrated, &
have found that a literary task abundantly, & superabundantly, difficult by
itself. […] I have never had anything to say which some word or other
already forming a part of human speech has not had, to my sense, something
to contribute of its own.13
James’s quasi-devotional attitude to these words – their ‘consecration’
through usage – is palpable in his prose; indeed, ‘his’ complex terms, as
part of their arrest, give rise to the characteristic difficulty of James’s texts
and, through a dynamic of misunderstanding and clarification, much dra-
matic suspense. In this sense, James’s ‘difficulty’ is passed on to his readers.
James’s conceptions of experience and sensibility, as we know from his
statements in ‘The Art of Fiction’ essay of 1884, become increasingly vision-
ary, even mystical, especially his emphasis on ‘the power to guess the unseen
from the seen, to trace the implication of things’.14 Like painterly abstraction,
James’s style of abstraction is heavily invested in ‘implication’ – as ‘the fact of
being implied or involved, without being plainly expressed’ – and it is easy to
see how ‘the condition of being involved, entangled, twisted together, inti-
mately connected or combined’ has applications in a literary or figurative
context as well as in a logical one (i.e. as ‘a relationship between propositions
such that the one implies the other’).15 Logical language and metaphors
clearly appealed to James as much as quasi-theological ones. As I mentioned
earlier, it is my sense that James pursued forms of creative abstraction such as
engrossment and bewilderment to stage not so much a total withdrawal from
life into ‘the vague’, or the purely cerebral or imaginary, but to achieve some-
thing closer to entanglement: that is to say, deep involvements between char-
acters and between readers and texts. In my view, it is something of a
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category error to attempt to prove that the aesthetic ‘involvements’ of
abstraction are really, by their nature, ‘ethical’, or vice versa; James’s
‘ethics’ (if he even subscribed to such a thing) would have been unhelpfully
idiosyncratic, founded on the creative value of an evasive or elliptical style of
abstraction designed to make us self-conscious about the forms of language
we commonly fall back on and appeal to, in ways that are often unthinking
and unfeeling. Does James want to improve us by making us query these
terms? And are we improved? What are the ‘implications’ for us? These
are the questions taken up by ethical critics of James. My position is that
Jamesian implicature, ushered in through his abstract terms and syntax,
works like philosophical implicature, but is ultimately very unlike the ‘impli-
cations’ (understood as ‘consequences’) of a practising ethicist – though it is
easy to see how these may be confounded. James’s style of abstraction might
even be said to mischievously invite this order of confusion.
The ‘standing terms’
In her pioneering 1983 essay ‘Flawed Crystals: James’s The Golden Bowl and
Literature as Moral Philosophy’, Martha Nussbaum sets out her reasons for
choosing neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics as a guiding principle in her criticism
of Henry James:
I choose this conception of moral inquiry not only because I find it appealing
and broadly correct, not only because I hope that it will be sufficiently inclusive
to command wide agreement, but also because it describes [James’s] con-
ception of his own authorial task in language which brings him into intimate
connection with the Aristotelian enterprise. In the Preface to The Princess
Casamassima, he describes his end as the production of an ‘intelligent
report’ of human experience, i.e. of ‘our apprehension and our measure of
what happens to us as social creatures’. We can then hope to be assessing
James’s text against the background of a conception of moral writing that is
at once powerful and one to which he himself lays claim.16
This is a strong assertion to make on behalf of James; however, Nussbaum
doesn’t cite the relevant line or passage from Aristotle’s Ethics that James’s
remark about the ‘intelligent report’ is meant to echo. Neither does she
describe the features of this phrase which make it a striking or unusual
way for James to reconceive of fiction: for example, the privileging of ‘intelli-
gence’ over sensuous perception (which, of course, comes down to James’s
method of focalisation through the mind of an ‘intelligent observer’, in
this case, Hyacinth Robinson); or the collapsing of generic distinctions so
that the novel becomes a ‘report’ – a conveniently non-fictional form, like
philosophy itself. Nor does Nussbaum address the not unimportant question
of whether James ever read Aristotle or found him congenial to his own
outlook on life.17 Further along, Nussbaum argues that
TEXTUAL PRACTICE 945
to show forth the force and truth of the Aristotelian claim that ‘the decision
rests with perception,’ we need, then ‒ either side by side with a philosophical
‘outline’ or inside it ‒ texts which display to us the complexity, the indetermi-
nacy, the sheer difficulty of moral choice.18
This is where (a text such as) The Golden Bowl becomes instrumental, since
[t]his task cannot be easily accomplished by texts which speak in universal
terms ‒ for one of the difficulties of deliberation stressed by this view is that
of grasping the uniqueness of the new particular. Nor can it be easily done
by texts which speak with the hardness or plainness which moral philosophy
has traditionally chosen for its style.19
What is troubling about these claims is that Nussbaum does not explain what
it means for a text to ‘speak in universal terms’. While hers is a seductive
argument capable of eliciting an easy consent – yes, moral philosophy
speaks in a language that is hard and plain and abstract; yes, James speaks
in a language that is malleable and rich yet also precise – it is weakened
by her reluctance to produce germane examples from James’s novel. In a
later, defensive essay (defensive, because of the cross-disciplinary contro-
versy that ensued), Nussbaum returns to The Golden Bowl to make this
point on behalf of the ideal novelist who is deemed ‘exemplary’ for the prac-
tice of ethical criticism:
The terms of the novelist can help us to discover ourselves precisely because
they are not the shop-worn terms of ordinary discourse, all too often relied
on by abstract philosophizing ‒ terms that James calls ‘the standing terms’
in order to indicate both their habitual character and their inertness.20
Here, too, Nussbaum takes a phrase from James’s Prefaces ‒ this time, ‘the
standing terms’ ‒ and makes it serviceable to her own project, neglecting
all kinds of possibilities centred on the appeal of the ordinary and the
abstract to this particular writer.21
What, then, are ‘the standing terms’ to which James refers in this passage
from the Preface to The Golden Bowl? In another reading, ‘the standing
terms’ are the texts of earlier versions of James’s novels. The 1909 Preface
is, after all, preoccupied with the act of revision. Here, James writes:
What it would be really interesting, and I dare say admirably difficult, to go
into would be the very history of this effect of experience; the history, in
other words, of the growth of the immense array of terms, perceptional and
expressional, that, after the fashion I have indicated, in sentence, passage
and page, simply looked over the heads of the standing terms ‒ or perhaps
rather, like alert winged creatures, perched on those diminished summits
and aspired to a clearer air.22
There is something disingenuous about James’s etherealisation of this delib-
erate, worldly act of revision. It sounds like a disavowal of agency: the nove-
list’s original ‘terms’ are somehow already ‘standing’ (established), while the
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revised terms are the product of a mysterious ‘growth’ or efflorescence.
Throughout Love’s Knowledge (1990) Nussbaum returns to this conceit of
James’s, still reading it as a certain kind of philosophy: something that
stands in opposition to ‘the terms of the novelist’. It is indeed true that
James creates an analogy between philosophical revelation and the act of
revision, which he finds to be (in his words) ‘almost as enlivening, or at
least as momentous, as, to a philosophic mind, a sudden large apprehension
of the Absolute’. He then ponders: ‘What indeed could be more delightful
than to enjoy a sense of the absolute in such easy conditions? The deviations
and differences might of course not have broken out at all, but from the
moment they began so naturally to multiply they became, as I say, my
very terms of cognition’.23 It may be seen from this where Nussbaum
takes her cue, linking James’s ‘standing terms’ with the ‘absolute’ terms,
say, of ‘abstract philosophising’. Yet where do the ‘terms of cognition’ fit
into this scheme? If the ‘deviations and differences’ between the original
incarnation of the novel and its reclaimed/reasserted or else reimagined/
rewritten form are the ‘very terms of cognition’, then it is not a straightfor-
ward matter of there being two sets of ‘terms’ (two kinds of language or dis-
course). Furthermore, the philosophical analogy may be less of an invitation
to view James’s writing in philosophical terms than merely this, an analogy,
made in one of the dominant registers of his day: the language of abstract
philosophical speculation.24 In this reading, James is not setting a philoso-
phical language against a novelistic one but describing the process of revision
– which for James, we know, was as much about reaffirming the ‘standing’ or
pre-existing ‘terms’ as it was about altering or embellishing them. By this
reasoning, many of James’s standing terms are left to ‘stand’.
Of course, Nussbaum’s broad argument in Love’s Knowledge is that
James’s late novels are unique in steering a course between general moral
rules and particular human situations. As a moral philosopher, she does
not claim to escape the perniciousness of the ‘standing terms’ of moral dis-
course; indeed, she characterises her own philosophising, as well as her para-
phrasing of James, as falling prey to the ‘standing terms’.25 She even describes
the ‘rules’ of moral philosophy, in language that recalls James’s expression, as
‘standing obligations’, ‘standing conception[s] of value’, ‘standing commit-
ments’ and indeed ‘standing terms’:
It is not just that the standing terms need to be rendered more precise in their
application to a concrete text. It is that, all by themselves, they might get it all
wrong; they do not suffice to make the difference between right and wrong
[…]. By themselves, trusted for and in themselves, the standing terms are a
recipe for obtuseness. 26
Hers is a critique, it transpires, not so much of Jamesian texts as of conven-
tional moral-philosophic discourse ‒ especially, one suspects, post-Kantian
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idealism. Yet it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish Nussbaum’s
claims from those she makes on behalf of James: ‘So if James is right
about what moral attention is, then he can fairly claim that a novel such
as this one not only shows it better than an abstract treatise, it also elicits
it’.27 Remarks such as this reveal the expediency of James for Nussbaum’s
argument; yet, in her eagerness to quieten such ‘general’ terms, Nussbaum
overlooks the possibility that one of the singularities of James’s prose is
the prevalence of exactly these ‘general’, ‘plain’, ‘hard’, ‘shop-worn’, ‘abstract’
terms that he is supposedly repudiating. Geoffrey Galt Harpham, one of
Nussbaum’s sternest critics, keenly draws attention to such contradictions.
Rather cynically, he views Nussbaum’s desire to collapse the boundaries
between moral philosophy and literary criticism as motivated by a megalo-
maniacal ambitiousness, an ‘almost unfathomable hunger’:
In her work the cohabitation of different academic disciplines generates, or is
intended to generate, a super-discourse oriented not toward the cultivation of
increasingly refined vocabularies and distinctions but toward action in ‘the
sphere of things that can be done’.28
The merging of the ethical and the aesthetic is of course not unique to Nuss-
baum and the neo-Aristotelian ethical critics. It is my belief that this wider
trend, the too-easy collapse of ethics and aesthetics, might be sidestepped
by a study of James’s abstract terms, precisely because they are abstract and
have applications in multiple discourses. James’s style of abstraction may be
the very thing to enable the two disciplines to return to a state of productive
tension.
‘Do’ / ‘doing’ / ‘done’
The epigraph to J. Hillis Miller’s Literature as Conduct (2005) is drawn from
another of James’s arresting statements from the Preface to The Golden Bowl:
‘the whole conduct of life consists of things done, which do other things in
their turn. […] we recognize betimes that to “put” things is very exactly and
responsibly and interminably to do them’. Miller draws our attention to an
allusion, nestled within this familiar quotation, to ‘a high-minded book by
Emerson’: The Conduct of Life (1860). The passage from the Preface to
The Golden Bowl in which James, as Miller contends, ‘emphasizes the super-
iority of putting things in words, as a form of doing, over other forms of
social behaviour’, is crucial to Miller’s thesis that ‘literature is a form of
conduct’, and also that ‘literature may conduct its readers to believe or to
behave in new ways’.29 James’s best-known Preface contains those memor-
able phrases that ethical critics of all stamps have found so enticing: ‘the
conduct of life’ and ‘the religion of doing’ chief among them.30 In their gloss-
ing of the final paragraph the stress invariably falls on ethical expressions,
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such as ‘the conduct of life’, ‘behaviour’, ‘acts’, ‘responsibility’ and ‘freedom’;
their intention, perhaps, is to bring home the moral force of James’s radical
stance on literary acts. Yet such readings don’t account for the importance of
the extended analogy to the Jamesian imaginary.31 That the topic of this
passage ‒ indeed, the final Preface itself – is the writerly process of revision
barely warrants a mention, and the casting of James’s ‘religion of doing’ as
a philosophy ignores the veiled jibe at those other contemporary ‘religions’
of doing to which James may be offering a (wounded) challenge: pragmatism,
for one,32 and Rooseveltian machismo, for another.33 Miller’s emphasis on
the conduct element of Jamesian ‘doing’ is in keeping with the way in
which action is given prominence in contemporary moral philosophy ‒
even if it enlarges the sphere of action to include speech acts.34
The stretch of Jamesian ‘doing’ is something that remains untested in
ethical criticism of James to date, with its more literal-minded understanding
of doing as acting (Nussbaum) and writing as the rehearsal of speech acts
(Miller). What is missing from such accounts, and what James still finds
room for in his ethical analogy, is that written ‘acts’ – ‘our really “done”
things of this superior and more appreciable order’ – are not really compar-
able to our social actions. My reading centres on James’s ‘interminably’: the
term usually bypassed in his trio of ‘exactly and responsibly and intermin-
ably’. James begins his final paragraph by stating that words, like deeds,
are ‘interminable’: boundless and endless in their ramifications; and
words, like deeds, may be disavowed. Yet unlike our actions, which tend
to ‘lose themselves’, our connections with our writings may be traced and
reasserted, reviewed and revised, upheld and maintained. Writing, unlike
acting, is ‘conduct with a vengeance’ – a term whose etymology, via
‘avenge’, suggests ‘to claim as one’s own’ – and this is exactly what revision
amounts to for James: reclamation. James is aware of the artist’s exception-
alism (his ‘incomparable luxury’) in this ethical scheme he uses to illustrate
his point, and he concludes this last Preface with the assertion that for the
literary artist ‘the whole chain of relation and responsibility’, his ‘connec-
tions’ to his work, ‘are employable for finer purposes than mere gaping
contrition’.35
Such accounts as those mentioned above inevitably glide over that special-
ised sense of Jamesian writerly ‘doing’: the Flaubertian ‘done’ or ‘finished’
thing. Of course, one can find moments in James in which the ‘done’
thing is indeed synonymous with the exemplary thing, but ‘exemplary’
only in the sense of being ‘exact’: ‘consummate, finished, refined, perfect’
(OED, sense 1). There is a whole chain of words that indicates both a
moral and an expressional fastidiousness; for a term such as ‘scrupulous’
the OED even demarcates the non-moral, so that sense 4.: ‘Of actions, etc.,
Rigidly directed by the dictates of conscience; characterized by a strict and
minute regard for what is right’; is set against sense 5.: ‘Minutely exact or
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careful (in non-moral matters); strictly attentive even to the smallest details;
characterized by punctilious exactness.’ This is perhaps why the ethical
analogy works so well for the matter of artistic finish. It is not that James
necessarily views writing as an ethical act, but his pursuit of written perfec-
tion certainly resembles moral perfectionism in its rigour and integrity and
intensity. Take, for instance, this passage from James’s 1902 essay on
‘Gustave Flaubert’:
Madame Bovary has a perfection that not only stamps it, but that makes it
stand almost alone; it holds itself with such a supreme unapproachable assur-
ance as both excites and defies judgement. For it deals not in the least, as to
unapproachability, with things exalted or refined; it only confers on its
sufficiently vulgar elements of exhibition a final unsurpassable form. The
form is in itself as interesting, as active, as much of the essence of the
subject as the idea, and yet so close is its fit and so inseparable its life that
we catch it at no moment on any errand of its own. The work is a classic
because the thing, such as it is, is ideally done, and because it shows that in
such doing eternal beauty may dwell.36
Here, many of the terms arise that James later uses in his Prefaces (1907–09):
‘form’, ‘done’ and ‘doing’ (as a gerund), ‘interesting’ and ‘active’. Yet in the
case of Flaubert’s masterpiece, its perfection sets it apart – from other works
by Flaubert and from works by his contemporaries, certainly, but also from
the author himself: it ‘stand[s] almost alone’ and is ‘unapproachable’. It is
not, James qualifies, unapproachable in the sense of being morally exemp-
lary: the subject of Madame Bovary (like Madame Bovary herself) is not
‘exalted or refined’ but ‘vulgar’. Miller might counter that its ‘treatment’
(another term that is both moral and aesthetic) is what makes Flaubert’s
handling of his low subject ethical. Yet why revert to ethics when James
enjoys an analogy that keeps both pursuits (ethics, aesthetics) in a state of
play, through his choice of a phrase (‘ideally done’) in which the verb form
(‘to do’) is not simply made into a past participle (‘to have done’) but an
abstract adjectival compound (‘is ideally done’)? The category error that is
entailed in the attempt to collapse the distinctions between ethics and aes-
thetics works both ways: the poetic analogies, say, in Aristotle’s Ethics (in
which ‘ergon’ is both task, or function, as well as work, ‘the done thing’)
are the corollary of James’s ethical analogies. Importantly, James’s accentu-
ating of Madame Bovary’s ‘form’ as both ‘active’ (normally a property of
plot) and ‘essential’ draws on the abstract language of philosophical idealism
(the Hegelian-sounding ‘in itself’, the Platonic-sounding ‘as much of the
essence of the subject as the idea’) as a way, ironically, of retreating from
the issue of actions in the real world, echoing James’s earlier quasi-mystical
statements in ‘The Art of Fiction’. Just as the term ‘vulgar’ wards off, to an
extent, the moral aspect of Flaubert’s perfectionism, so too does the ‘insepar-
ability’ of its baseness and its beauty obstruct the aspect of ‘art for art’s sake’
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(the motto of nineteenth-century Aestheticism). Like Lambert Strether, the
punctilious hero of The Ambassadorswho refuses to take from his diplomatic
mission anything for himself, we ‘catch’ the formal perfection of Madame
Bovary ‘at no moment on any errand of its own’: that is, in service of
neither ethics nor aesthetics.37
One vital aspect of the ‘done’ thing about which James’s final Preface is
rather reticent is its apparent ‘dreadfulness’. This is something James
addresses, rather, in his 1908 Preface to The Spoils of Poynton:
Which is the work in which he [the novelist] hasn’t surrendered, under dire
difficulty, the best thing he meant to have kept? In which, indeed, before the
dreadful done, doesn’t he ask himself what has become of the thing all for
the sweet sake of which it was to proceed to that extremity?38
‘Dreadful’ is probably being used here in the sense of ‘formidable’ or even
‘awe-inspiring’, rather than in the modern colloquial sense of ‘awful’; there
is a certain fear registered in the phrase ‘before the dreadful done’, as
though the creator is standing before his creature, terrified that this ‘thing’
may have a life of its own. In this way, James surely refers to the anxiety
that he feels, as an artist, once he has decided that he cannot do any more
work on a piece, that he is unable to go further in pursuing his aims – even
that he has reached the point where he must accept that those aims are unac-
hievable. Thus, what emerges is a horror at the dire ‘extremity’ of the finished
work, with its record of betrayals and compromise (‘the surrendered’, the not-
‘kept’). Present and looming is the anxiety as to the fate of the artwork at the
hands of audience and critics, and ultimately the verdict of time and history –
the biblical inflections of ‘dreadful’ here resonating with a doom-laden fear of
consigning one’s work to the moment of ‘judgement’. James continues this
theme in another late Preface, that of The Wings of the Dove:
The residuum of comfort for the witness of these broils is of course meanwhile
in the convenient reflexion, invented for him in the twilight of time and the
infancy of art by the Angel, not to say by the Demon, of Compromise, that
nothing is so easy to ‘do’ as not to be thankful for almost any stray help in
its getting done.39
Here, his ‘alert winged creatures’ are recast as ‘the Angel’ – or indeed ‘the
Demon’ – ‘of Compromise’, or even as the Dirae (dire sisters) of the previous
passage, with its invocation of ‘dire difficulty’. But importantly, as this
passage shows, ‘the done’ thing is not, unequivocally, the ‘exemplary’ thing
in James, despite his assertion to the contrary in the Preface to The Golden
Bowl (‘art is nothing if not exemplary’); as we saw in the case of Madame
Bovary, if it is ‘exemplary’, it is so because it is, formally speaking, ‘admirable,
commendable; excellent, outstanding, perfect’ (OED, sense 1a), but there is
no suggestion that the novel should be ‘intended as a model or guide’
(OED, sense 4a). What’s more, there is a weariness registered here in the
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endless toil of ‘doing’ – with ‘do’ given inverted commas either for its collo-
quial usage or for the irony of this small word being made to bear such a load.
Jamesian abstraction
It is against her personal history of recoil against Anglo-American analytic
philosophy that one should view Nussbaum’s exalting of James’s late style,
her setting it apart from a certain style of abstract philosophising.40
Nussbaum does not address the enigma that many of James’s late works ‒
from the novels and tales to the Prefaces, essays and reviews, biographies,
travelogues, letters and notebooks ‒ display passages written precisely in ‘a
style correct, scientific, abstract’, the kind of style that she dismisses for
betraying ‘Anglo-American fastidiousness and emotional reticence’.41
While James’s distinctly literary abstraction is clearly not identical to
philosophical abstraction, which aims for the ‘fixing’ of meaning rather
than its ‘unfixing’,42 Nussbaum’s strenuous emphasis on Jamesian particu-
larity and concreteness is made at the expense of recognising this equally
Jamesian trait of abstraction. James’s supposed ‘claim’ that, in Nussbaum’s
terms, ‘only language this dense, this concrete, this subtle ‒ only the language
(and the structures) of the narrative artist, can adequately tell the reader what
[he] believes to be true’, would appear then to go against James’s own crea-
tive practices. Disappointingly, despite her insistence that James’s particular-
ity ‘focus[es] our attention on each word’, Nussbaum rarely gets down to the
business of close reading for ‘vivid and subtle nuance’.43
James’s fondness for abstraction was such that it was jeeringly remarked
by journalists writing for the newspapers and magazines of his day. Witness,
for example, this anonymous reviewer of The Sacred Fount (1901) writing in
the American periodical Current Literature:
Everybody talks […] in that brilliantly tedious tongue which the James char-
acters always use, filling three hundred pages with abstractions, innuendoes,
hair-splitting distinctions, and what are probably epigrams, all so arranged
that it is possible to read three pages without getting a scintilla of an idea as
to what they are driving at;
or Francis Thompson, reviewing The American Scene (1907) for the more
upmarket British magazine The Athenaeum:
The language invented, and the manner of thought developed, for his psycho-
logical subtleties he uses for matters the most familiar, and so reduces them to
a strange, phantasmal abstraction of their workaday selves, bafflingly implying
subtlety which is not in them.44
The novelist Vernon Lee, an admirer of James and one of his first serious
critics, points out the prevalence of abstract nouns in his novels (‘form’,
‘relation’, ‘degree’, ‘sense’ and ‘consequence’), writing in mock exasperation:
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‘I almost believe that my analysis is less abstract than this sentence out of a
bona fide novel!’45 Importantly, Lee observes a technique in the novel that
‘enables the Reader to live on through more abstraction’: the alternation
between the ‘abstract’ and the ‘concrete’ (or, elsewhere, the ‘abstract’ and
the ‘metaphorical’).46 This point is something most modern critics of Jame-
sian style have taken up – notably Ian Watt, Dorothea Krook and Seymour
Chatman – but also more recently Emily Zubernis, who argues that Jamesian
abstraction is what makes his novels ‘minimalist’: ‘not as a thing of terse
flatness or truncated form but as an extravagantly intricate withdrawal
from the novel’s meaning-making functions’. Abstraction as withdrawal, as
pulling away from the material rather than as simple inwardness, is a topic
to which I shall return.47
In his renowned explication of the first paragraph of The Ambassadors,
Ian Watt, like Vernon Lee, describes the tedium resulting from the many
instances of abstract language in the novel. After carefully enumerating the
most distinctive ‘verbal idiosyncrasies’ in James’s opening paragraph, such
as the high frequency of non-transitive verbs, negatives and near-negatives,
as well as abstract nouns such as ‘question’, ‘understanding’, ‘business’ and
‘principle’, Watt reassures his reader that his own purpose is far from ped-
antic: ‘I detail these features only to establish that in this passage, at least,
there is a clear quantitative basis for the common enough view that
James’s late prose style is characteristically abstract […]’.48 Watt rehearses
an excellent hypothesis in this essay: that James’s abstractionism stems not
so much from literary-formalist as from socio-political imperatives, the
author’s ‘awareness that behind every petty individual circumstance there
ramifies an endless network of general moral, social, and historical relations’.
Watt’s point hinges on his discernment of the multi-perspectivalism of
James’s prose, in this case, the combined impressions of Strether and the nar-
rator, who de-emphasises what is ‘single and particular’ about Strether’s per-
ceptions by ‘translat[ing] what he sees there into more general terms’,
creating several effects at once, which pull in different directions: an
‘ironic distance’ between narrator and protagonist, a comic puncturing of
Strether’s inflated ‘representativeness’, and a serious investment in the
‘larger import’ of the events being narrated. The abstraction of James’s
style, Watt argues, can therefore be seen as ‘a supremely civilised effort to
relate every event and every moment of life to the full complexity of its cir-
cumambient conditions’.49 James’s style of abstraction, in other words, can
be grasped as a material incarnation of a deeply ‘ramified’ or diversified lin-
guistic awareness that is informed by a profound social commitment. Ver-
sions of this idea have been advanced by recent thinkers who adopt a
historical materialist position on the question: Elizabeth A. Barnum, for
instance, argues that James’s abstract language ‘can gesture toward a space
in which people can reclaim their full humanity and reject the reification
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of life’ as part of her argument that Jamesian style offers an implicit critique
of capitalism;50 by contrast, others have argued that his characteristic ‘mys-
tification’ resembles the very processes of capitalism, with one crucial differ-
ence: James keeps this process self-reflexively in view.51
As Watt notes, Dorothea Krook’s work on James’s style in the 1950s was
instrumental in shaping his own critical position on Jamesian abstraction.
Like Watt, Krook identifies in James the rare ability to generalise particulars,
or as she puts it ‘the power to generalise to the furthest limit the particulars of
experience, and to render these without loss of particularity in the light of the
most inclusive generality’.52 She puts this down to the ‘singularity’ of James’s
‘quest’, which ‘in its logical or philosophical aspect shows as a pursuit of the
highest generality, in its poetic aspect as a search for that which is at once the
ground and end of a man’s life’.53 With this, Krook attempts to re-write the
‘abstraction’ smear against James – both in his own day, and in hers, by
critics like F. R. Leavis who preferred the early style to the late – in distinctly
ethical terms. But her interest, rather, is in another branch of philosophy:
logic.54 Like Watt – who, as we recall, sees James’s abstraction as being
motivated by the ‘effort to relate […] every moment of life to the full com-
plexity of its circumambient conditions’ – Krook argues for the importance
of ‘aspects’, ‘conditions’ and ‘internal relations’, both to James’s theory of the
novel and to the novels themselves. To speak of the ‘logic’ (and even the
‘metaphysics’) of James’s late fiction and non-fiction is not exactly to posit
James as a philosophical novelist. As Krook clarifies, his use of ‘logical
terms and images’ comes not from the idealist philosophers of his day
(F. H. Bradley or T. H. Green, say), or any other individual or school, but
from ‘the ambient air of nineteenth-century speculation, whose main
current was the preoccupation with the phenomenon of self-conscious-
ness’.55 The exploration of self-consciousness was naturally not confined
to philosophy; as Krook shows, James read his novelistic contemporaries ‒
Balzac, George Eliot, Turgenev, Howells, Bourget, Mrs Humphry Ward,
Edith Wharton ‒ ‘with a passion of interest that stands in marked contrast
with his always languid response to the logical edifices of systematic philoso-
phers’.56 Indeed, this is verified by James himself, who in his autobiographi-
cal Notes of a Son & Brother (1914) confessed that his own mind was ‘as
receptive […] of any scrap of enacted story or evoked picture as it was
closed to the dry or abstract proposition’.57 Ultimately, Krook links
James’s tendency towards abstraction and the language and thought-pro-
cesses of logic to his notorious obliquity, which in her view enacts a kind
of ethical ‘consequentialism’: ‘if this is the fundamental logic of James’s
mature thinking, the method of oblique or indirect presentation may be
seen as yet another instance of that high, rare consequentiality which is
the characteristic expression of his genius’.58 Krook doesn’t explain or
develop this proposed link between obliquity and consequentiality, and it
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remains unclear whether she means ‘consequential’ in the sense of ‘substan-
tial’ or ‘momentous’, or in the sense of ‘ensuing’ or ‘resultant’ (or both). One
thing that the oblique and the consequential share is that they both may take
some time to manifest.
Krook’s singular remark about consequentialism may well have been
prompted by her reading of the Pragmatist philosopher William James, for
whom, like his brother Henry, the abstract always underwrote the concrete.
In Part XIII of The Meaning of Truth (1909) William James proposes that
abstract concepts
are salient aspects of our concrete experiences which we find it useful to single
out. Useful, because we are then reminded of other things that offer those same
aspects; and, if the aspects carry consequences in those other things, we can
return to our first things, expecting those same consequences to accrue.59
Both the abstract and the concrete, according to William, are indispensable
to any conception of the real and any method of philosophy:
Without abstract concepts to handle our perceptual particulars by, we are like
men hopping on one foot. Using concepts along with the particulars, we
become bipedal. We throw our concept forward, get a foothold on the conse-
quence, hitch our line to this, and draw our percept up, travelling thus with a
hop, skip and jump over the surface of life at a vastly rapider rate than if we
merely waded through the thickness of the particulars as accident rained
them down upon our heads. Animals have to do this, but men raise their
heads higher and breathe freely in the upper conceptual air.60
This passage is a wonderful instance of the way in which the strange hybrid
of ‘animate abstraction’, in Mary Cross’s phrase, appealed to the Jamesian
(family) sensibility. In such constructions, abstract concepts such as ‘conse-
quence’, ‘percept’, ‘life’, etc., are endowed with figurative properties, so that
they become concrete: the vivid ‘hopping’ objects of the meandering sen-
tence.61 Part of William James’s broader point about abstractionism is
that, in isolation and without the aid of concretes or particulars, it is hope-
lessly metaphysical and stranded in an angelic realm without practical appli-
cation. As a philosopher, his own writing relied on novelistic techniques
perhaps more than he’d have cared to admit. One thing is certain: he had
a lifelong disdain for the style of abstraction characteristic of his brother’s
fiction.62 Upon reading Henry’s second novel, Roderick Hudson (1875), he
wrote to him with what had become, even at this early stage, a common com-
plaint: ‘I am again struck unfavorably by the tendency of the personages to
reflect on themselves and give an acute critical scientific introspective
classification of their own natures and states of mind […]’.63 When it
came to Henry James’s magnum opus, The Golden Bowl (1904), he was grud-
gingly admiring of its ‘brilliancy’ but lamented ‘the method of narration by
interminable elaboration of suggestive reference’ and found himself longing
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rather for ‘absolute straightness in the style’.64 Henry was clearly wounded by
this remark, and seems to allude toWilliam’s verdict on his late style when he
came to write his 1909 Preface to The Ambassadors, where he asserts – point-
edly, adversarially – the ‘inevitable treachery of even the straightest
execution’.65 Yet in 1905, Henry’s riposte was comprehensive:
I’m always sorry when I hear of your reading anything of mine, & always hope
you won’t – you seem to me so constitutionally unable to ‘enjoy’ it, & so con-
demned to look at it from a point of view remotely alien to mine in writing it,
& to the conditions out of which, as mine, it has inevitably sprung – so that all
the intentions that have been its main reason for being (with me,) appear never
to have reached you at all […]. I see nowhere about me done or dreamed of the
things that alone for me constitute the interest of the doing of the novel –& yet
it is in a sacrifice of them on their very own ground that the thing you suggest
to me evidently consists.66
Here, Henry criticises William by using the latter’s own pragmatistic prin-
ciples: the importance of circumambient conditions; the ethos of a text
being more important than its details; ‘the doing of the novel’ functioning
(grammatically, at least) like an act in the world. Typically, Henry adverts to
his own peculiar informing conditions in the abstract: as ‘conditions’, ‘inten-
tions’, ‘interest’. In his final plaint (‘I see nowhere about me done or dreamed
of […]’) he sounds the charge of Hamlet (Act I, Scene v): ‘There are more
things in heaven and earth, Horatio, / Than are dreamt of in your philosophy’.
‘Dreadful things to do… ’
To illustrate James’s style of abstraction, I shall pursue the ‘do’/‘doing’/‘done’
triad through the pivotal third chapter of Book 5 of The Golden Bowl, a novel
that in many ways revolves on, or crystallises itself around, a consideration of
‘the done thing’. This chapter immediately follows the extended evening
sequence at the country house Fawns when Maggie – privately struggling
to assimilate the adultery of her husband Prince Amerigo with her school-
friend, now her father’s wife, Charlotte – has had to make a crucial decision:
and chooses denial of the truth. She evades the chance to bring the affair into
the open when confronted by her mother-in-law – an instinctive deceit,
necessary in order to protect those she loves, and herself:
She saw she was right – that this was the tone for her to take and the thing for
her to do, the thing as to which she was probably feeling that she had in
advance, in her delays and uncertainties, much exaggerated the difficulty.
The difficulty was small, and it grew smaller as her adversary continued to
shrink; she was not only doing as she wanted, but had by this time effectively
done it and hung it up. All of which but deepened Maggie’s sense of the sharp
and simple need now of seeing her through to the end. ‘“If” you’ve been mis-
taken, you say?’ – and the Princess but barely faltered. ‘You have been
mistaken.’67
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Here James uses ‘doing’ and ‘done’ in a complex formulation which shows
Maggie affirming to herself that she has chosen ‘to do’ the correct thing, in
the right ‘tone’; also, that she has both realised her best course of action and
acted simultaneously. Her epiphany is indivisible from the moment that she
actively enters the lapsarian world by acting mendaciously and manipula-
tively. Tellingly, there is the desperate, onemight say Trollopian, irony attach-
ing to ‘She saw she was right’ – only, not ‘right’ as against her husband’s
‘wrong’: ‘right’ in her move to forgo recrimination and save her marriage.68
In the next chapter, Maggie, having entered this different moral universe,
rapidly demonstrates a newly liberated sense of agency, where ‘doing’ and
‘done’ abound; talking with her father in the garden on the day following
her scene with Charlotte, she begins to formulate and enact a plan to separate
the lovers. She re-perceives the strength of the union that she has with her
father, even as she begins to realise that it must be sacrificed, and hypoth-
esises a question which is almost menacing in its implications:
They had after all, whatever happened, always and ever each other; each other
– that was the hidden treasure and the saving truth – to do exactly what they
would with: a provision full of possibilities. Who could tell as yet what, thanks
to it, they wouldn’t have done before the end?69
Her self-belief and self-justification grow, likewise her understanding that
her father’s deep emotional connection with her has allowed him to divine
the best solution for her – one towards which she is herself moving –
without perhaps full knowledge of their situation, or at least without open
acknowledgement of it between them:
[…] she saw more clearly with each lapsing instant what they were both doing.
He was doing what he had steadily been coming to; he was practically offering
himself, pressing himself upon her, as a sacrifice – he had read his way so into
her best possibility […].70
The paternal self-sacrifice is based upon the perceptions which are explicitly
described by James as an act of ‘reading’; the loving empathy of Mr Verver
with his daughter allows him to achieve this insightful discrimination and
to collaborate with her instinctively. Exactly who conceives the plan for
Adam and Charlotte to return to America, and when, is not spelt out; the
creative fusion of its origin lies literally between the lines.
‘Dreadfulness’ immediately arises again here in conjunction with the verb
‘to do’; Maggie finds vindication in the incriminating action of the adulterers:
‘if something dreadful hadn’t happened there wouldn’t for either of them be
these dreadful things to do’.71 For her, ‘the done thing’ is both the invidious
thing (the adultery) and the proper thing that puts it right (the separation of
the lovers); like countless women in fiction before her, she overlooks the sin
of her husband not because she is immoral (or so the ethical reading runs),
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but because she is trying out a new kind of enlightened morality, one that has
the best interests of the quartet at heart. But another reading might be that
Maggie is cloaking her actions with an ethical language that is self-deceiving
(at best) and self-serving (at worst). Arguably, Maggie shows great emotional
maturity in letting go of her complaint against Charlotte and her husband, but
at the same stroke she is brutally complicit in having Charlotte literally shipped
away. The ‘done thing’, the consummate thing, including or especially con-
summation – in all its forms – is truly dreadful to Maggie. She articulates
the fear of Jamesian characters when faced with ‘things to do’, with taking
steps of irrevocable action. There is an inherently civilised quality to their
‘doing’, a hesitancy which registers the potentially damaging ramifications of
what it is ‘to do’; yet it is only masking the ruthlessly self-protective actions
they have admitted they are prepared to undertake.
Maggie herself becomes one of the ‘alert winged creatures’, and indeed a
teetering Angel of compromise, in this section, where James uses the same
words that he employed in his description of the process of revision in the
novel’s Preface – this time to describe his protagonist’s own narrative revi-
sion of the past. Of Maggie’s tenacious refusal to admit her knowledge of
their spouses’ mutual infidelity when tested by the interrogative stare of
her father, the narrator, focalised in this section through Maggie’s conscious-
ness, remarks that ‘as if perched up before him on her vertiginous point and
in the very glare of his observation, she balanced for thirty seconds, she
almost rocked […]’.72 By holding up to her father’s hard inspection a
patched-up façade of willed non-admission she enables them to get past
this strained period and reach a better (for them) phase of life, without the
acknowledgement of their partners’ wrongdoing, which could have precipi-
tated a much more dramatic destruction of relationships. The effort of dissim-
ulation is not easy: ‘She held herself hard; the thing was to be done, once for all,
by her acting nowwhere she stood.’73 In this passage, Maggie steels herself, like
Lady Macbeth – afterwards haunted by her action as much as by the phrase
itself: ‘What’s done is done’ – to do the ‘dreadful thing’, reconceived as the
‘right thing’ and formulated in a passive infinitive verb form (‘was to be
done’).74 It is clear why Maggie would want to drain this thought of all
agency. Nestled within that phrase, the inflexional verb form ‘to be done’ is
both an injunction to act and the presumption of a certain futurity where
the ‘done thing’ – is once and for all behind Maggie. The effort and horror
of ‘doing’ ̶ of performing actions which irrevocably commit, and entrain con-
sequence – extends from the authorial act of writing itself, of committing
oneself to the page, to the actions of characters in an aesthetic arena where
drama unfolds from ethical, or less than ethical, choices.
One may find in these passages from Book 5, Chapter 3 of James’s last
great novel the fullest elaboration of his style of abstraction, taking in the sty-
listic idiosyncrasies explored by Ian Watt, Dorothea Krook, Seymour
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Chatman, and others. Following the turning point for Maggie in the previous
chapter – her notorious encounter with her step-mother on the terrace at
Fawns – James is here concerned with her examination of her own and
her father’s states of mind. To look at one paragraph in particular (‘At this
it hung… ’),75 terms of mental evaluation proliferate, in many abstract
nouns such as: ‘impression’, ‘intention’, ‘vision’, ‘attitude’, ‘observation’.
This subset of nouns crosses over into those from another field of discourse,
a medical lexicon: ‘dizziness’, ‘symptoms’, ‘vigilance’. Then there is another
register which is altogether more unnerving: ‘unrest’, ‘pressure’, ‘warning’,
‘suspicion’, ‘secret’, ‘sacrifice’, ‘intensity’. The anxiety of the Ververs, which
these nouns help to express, derives from the unvoiceable, unanswerable
questions as to the extent of each character’s knowledge regarding the
others, and further, the extent of each protagonist’s grasping towards
options which might enable or force a solution serving their own best inter-
ests. These complexities are not easily expressed by the characters, due to
their inherent intangibility, the disquiet they entail, and their evolving
status: ambiguity swarms. Indeterminate nouns such as ‘thing’, ‘things’,
‘something’, ‘nothing’, and vague words such as ‘space’, ‘possibility’,
‘matter’, hamper the reader’s clear comprehension at the same time as
they express the characters’ mental confusion. Not only is it the language
that is abstract, but the syntax too: James’s sentences in this lengthy para-
graph are typically meandering and multi-clausal, freighted by multiple
modifiers. Whereas so many of the terms in the Jamesian sentence are
‘abstract’ in the sense of ‘conceptual’ (OED, sense 1b), the sentence construc-
tions seem ‘abstract’ in another sense: ‘Lacking awareness of or concen-
tration on what is happening around one; distracted, preoccupied,
faraway’ (OED, sense 4). In the first sentence, James makes extensive use
of personal and impersonal pronouns:
At this it hung before her that she should have had as never yet her opportu-
nity to say, and it held her for a minute as in a vise, her impression of his now,
with his strained smile, which touched her to deepest depths, sounding her in
his secret unrest.
James forces the reader to differentiate constantly, at the most basic level,
between subject and object and various pronouns, which the tested reader
might be tempted to label as dismayingly dislocated. More often than not,
agency is ascribed to aspects of consciousness themselves – which has the
effect of withdrawing Maggie from her situation: abstracting her, as it
were. And Maggie’s withdrawal from immediate action into the reflection
that precedes it establishes a pattern for that of the ideal reader. The necess-
ary absorption, engrossment and bewilderment experienced by James’s
reader in trying to decipher his text reflects that of his characters, as they
struggle to manoeuvre through their circumstances, equipped only with
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the acuity with which they can perceive, realise, and convert meditation into
self-assisting action.
***
In his book on The Later Style of Henry James, Chatman sounds a querulous
note: ‘But surely “difficulty” is a consequence, not a formative principle or
“motive”, of a style… ’.76 My argument has been that James’s abstraction
is precisely this: a ‘motive’ of his style. James’s motivating abstraction,
which reaches its apotheosis in The Golden Bowl, represents a pulling
away from the concrete and the particular, away even from narrative and
representation, at the same time as it keeps these things in view: in the
ideal, perfectly ‘done’ thing that it aspires to be. In this connection, James
emerges as a proto-modernist: his abstraction is a key part of his avant-
gardism. Yet this stylistic method or ‘motive’ pre-dates literary modernism.
As far back as 1868 George Eliot had reflected on the appeal of abstract
language in her notebook: ‘Abstract words and phrases which have an excel-
lent genealogy are apt to live a little too much on their reputation and even to
sink into dangerous impostors that should be made to show how they get their
living.’ This bringing to account, in Eliot’s view, was best achieved by plotting
the relation of the senses of abstract words to each other: ‘to any but those who
are under the dire necessity of using the word and cannot afford to wait for a
meaning, it must be more fruitful to ask, what relations of things can properly
be included under the word’.77 James was interested in dramatising these
relations, which is why so much of his dialogue sounds portentous, suggestive
– and, by the same token, scrupulously discreet. So, alongside the possibility of
an avant-garde abstractionism running through James, there is a more conser-
vative mode of artistry at work: abstraction in the service of decorum or deli-
cacy. In both readings, one finds James pulling back or away, offering
disclosures that complicate more than they clarify, that stall or stymie more
than they point the path to virtuous action. Regardless of its provenance, Jame-
sian abstraction functions as a challenge to Nussbaum’s and Miller’s claims
that the singularity and specificity of Jamesian prose is what enables a
working ‘ethics’ to emerge from his style, or from the activity of reading
him. Jamesian abstraction, far from condemning James to the cerebral or phi-
losophical or even the purely aesthetic, reveals his pursuit of an enriching
engrossment in states of relatedness which transcend the representational
only to settle, finally, in his own awful worship of ‘the dreadful done’.
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